FIRST IN A SERIES OF FOUR ARTICLES By BRITTA B. HARRIS
A Lincoln housewife, and mother of five,
Ms. Harris followed and researched the
events of the Oakley Dam controversy for
seven years in order to write her master's thesis in public administration for the University of Illinois at Urbana. She has also taught political science at Lincoln College.
A struggle spanning three decades pitted the Army
Corps of Engineers and the City of Decatur against
conservationists and farmers with the U of I in the
middle. When the curtain fell, there was no dam, but
the way we make decisions had been exposed
ONE OF THE BITTEREST and most
protracted controversies in the recent
history of Illinois is finally over.
Although the debate over Oakley Dam
has stretched on for more than 30 years,
the majority of the state's citizens
outside of east central Illinois have
never heard of it, and the few who have
did not understand the baroque complexity of the largest public works project ever proposed for central Illinois. Four U.S. senators, Republicans Charles Percy and Everett Dirksen and Democrats Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson, two governors, Democrat Otto Kerner and Republican Richard Ogilvie, and two congressmen, William Springer and Edward Madigan, both
Republicans, gave it strong support. But
in spite of this powerful official approval, combined with the determined promotion of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, this Sangamon River project was ultimately, and perhaps inevitably, doomed. Since 1945, dozens of government
agencies, the University of Illinois,
many private organizations and lobby
groups and countless private individuals
argued fiercely over the proposed dam
and reservoir complex to be built near
the rural Oakley area north of Decatur.
Proposed in 1945 as a modest flood
control reservoir on the Sangamon
River costing about $4.8 million. Oakley mushroomed into a huge, multi-purpose project with two reservoirs and
a price tag of $120 million before it was finally cancelled after an investigation
by the federal General Accounting
Office in 1975. This report and the
persistent efforts of a cadre of citizens
concerned that the proposed reservoir
would flood Allerton Park near Monticello caused the Corps to withdraw from
the project it had championed so
vigorously for over three decades. No one simple reason can be given for
the Oakley debacle, but a cluster of
failures in communication, research and
coordination can be discerned by
following the threads of controversy
and litigation over the years. If poor
coordination caused the failure, the next
question is whether our society, our
institutions, are organized in such a way
that any proper planning for such a
project could have taken place. It may
be that the competing interests involved
were so diverse and inherently antagonistic that the comprehensive effort
required was and is quite beyond the
capabilities of any governmental entity
or private consortium. But Americans
have always been able to organize for
almost anything — if the proper incentives were there — and the more likely
reason for Oakley's failure is that the
project was ill conceived from the start.
The determination of the Corps to
undertake an ambitious public works
project like Oakley matched the desire
of the city of Decatur to increase its
water supply and save Lake Decatur,
but neither reason, in the final analysis,
outweighed the environmental, economic and agricultural drawbacks so
loudly proclaimed by Oakley's detractors. Because water is a migratory resource, flowing across political boundaries, a special set of requirements is necessary for purposes such as water
supply, water quality, flood control,
farm and municipal drainage and
recreation, as well as for growing
demands to preserve natural resources.
Illinois is water-rich, but many areas in
the state are short of water because of
geologic conditions and changing demographic patterns. The state has more
water miles than most states, a high rate
of replenishment through rainfall and
has twice the national percentage of
flooding. Consequently, flood control
has become a major government activity, as has the use of surface water for
water supply and recreation. Large
water projects benefit some communities while others suffer adverse impacts.
Cooperation between communities
competing for water use and control is
rare. Furthermore, water resource
planning has been complicated by
confrontations between developers and
conservationists. Another difficulty is
that the time-honored use of water
management tools such as channelization and multi-purpose reservoirs is
more often challenged by citizens
equipped with the engineering, hydrological and ecological expertise to
support their objections. Finally, the
ultimate problem in water resource September 1976 / Illinois Issues / 3
First proposed for flood
control, the dam was
changed by the Corps
with Decatur support to
include water supply,
recreation and
pollution control
development is to find a common
ground where all these interests can
agree and public responsibilities can still
be met. For more than 30 years, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers worked on the
development of a dam and reservoir
system on the Sangamon River as part
of a comprehensive flood control plan
for the entire Illinois River watershed.
The Oakley Project evolved from a dry
basin for flood control to a pair of multipurpose reservoirs providing flood
control, water supply for the city of
Decatur, recreation and, at one time,
water quality for pollution control. In
1966, when the proposed project was
expanded for recreation and pollution
control, there were angry protests from
many area citizens. Sufficient water
storage for the four "benefits" required a
high dam, which would have backed
reservoir waters upstream to a point
where thousands of acres of rich farmland, as well as forests in Allerton Park,
would have been flooded. Allerton
Park, located in Piatt County near
Monticello, is a 1,500-acre estate given
to the University of Illinois by the late
Robert Allerton, wealthy landowner
and son of a midwest tycoon. The
sacrifice of any part of the park, which is
used for educational, scientific and
cultural purposes, was considered
unthinkable by many people. A coalition of citizens led by university faculty
members and Champaign conservationists was organized to save the park.
Their dedicated campaign initiated an
incredibly complex chain of events
which eventually put the brakes on
project planning. After more than 30
years of human effort and public
expenditure, all that remains of the
Oakley mirage is some lingering bitterness and a classic public administration
case study in the pitfalls of narrow,
project-oriented planning. During the course of the Oakley
mirage, several attempts were made to
establish comprehensive land and water
resource planning with coordination
and communication between local, state
and federal agencies. Most of these
efforts failed because of secrecy, misunderstanding, a lack of shared goals,
motivation and sufficient authority.
Timing also played a part in Oakley's
failure. The struggle between the Oakley
and Allerton forces peaked at a time
when debate over environmental issues
was developing. Citizens were more
aware of the value of irreplaceable
natural resources such as Allerton Park.
Environmentalists insisted on wide
consultation to balance information
presented by public agencies to promote
projects such as Oakley.
The Corps' methods
4 / September 1976 / Illinois Issues
Many issues came and went while
Oakley remained on the drawing board,
but sustained throughout were questions related to the methods used by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to advance its project. Specifically, detractors disagreed with the Corps' methods
of estimating future benefits, especially
those for flood control. The Corps is one
of the oldest and most powerful bureaucracies in the nation and is skilled in the
art of political manipulation. It has had
many powerful critics. In 1955 the
Hoover Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of Government
said the Corps' benefits were frequently
overstated. The Hoover Commission
said national policy led to the authorization of many projects of questionable merit, and it offered suggestions for the
transfer of the Corps' civil functions to
another agency. Water resources development, the report said, should be on a
regional watershed basis rather than on
a project basis which might favor local
interests.
The recommendations made by the
Hoover Commission failed, and the
Corps continued to exercise its vast
power over the development of water
management programs in the country.
In 1975, the Corps' powers were again
being reviewed, but this time from the
point of view of increasing that power.
Under study in 1975 was a plan to
expand the Corps' jurisdiction of
waterway authority to cover every body
of water in the nation. All lakes and
streams, even irrigation ditches and
marshes, could, under current proposals, come under the authority and
supervision of the Corps. An examination of the Corps' espousal of the Oakley
project can provide some insight into
how it has worked in the past and
perhaps some notion of whether its
power should be enlarged in the future.
The COAP
As the Oakley drama unfolded.
individuals and groups adhering to
policies expressed by the Corps and the
city of Decatur were opposed by those
sharing views shaped by the Committee
On Allerton Park (COAP), the coalition
which was dedicated to save the park
from permanent flood damage. Between
these polarized positions there were
important interests whose positions
shifted during the course of the struggle.
Piatt County, designated by the
Corps' Oakley design plan as the area to
accommodate the backup of Oakley
floodwaters, became a major arena of
political strife. Many Piatt citizens
objected strenuously to plans for flooding; others played with the idea of bringing in even more water to encourage the
development of a recreation-based
tourist economy. Others in the county
appealed to state and local officials for
comprehensive valley planning. Throughout the years of conflict, the
University of Illinois had trouble
establishing a policy towards the project. Torn between its legal responsibilities for the Allerton property and its
desire to maintain popular good will for
the university, the University Board of
Trustees first bowed to the project's
inevitability and then retreated, claiming the need for further study and
review. The board agreed to a compromise proposed by the state, but when the
Corps forced compromise changes,
there was displeasure and distrust. After
more studies, the board withdrew
university support for the project.
State government
Decatur, anxious to augment its
municipal water supplies with water
from Oakley, became the Corps' earliest
and most dedicated ally. City leaders
used their political influence to persuade
slate and federal support of Oakley. The
project, which had been on the Corps'
drawing boards since 1937, languished
for many years until the influence of
Decatur overwhelmed former objections to the project. Decatur city
officials had worried about the city's
future water supply for many years, and
it was natural that they would look to the federal project as a likely solution to
their problem. Located just a few miles
north of Decatur, the project had the
potential to serve many purposes for a
growing population.
The policies of the state government,
shaped by three successive administrations, were basically political, and the
ambitions of individuals sometimes
conflicted with objective professional
standards. Because of this and the
differences between several sets of
standards involved in the state's administration of natural resources, the state's
Oakley policies were often inept and
confused. State officials successively
promoted the project, offered compromises, and sought neutrality. The
project was never considered solely
from the broad vantage point of regional planning where a wide range of
interests in the Sangamon River Valley
could be reviewed.
Like many cities in Illinois, Decatur had a municipal water supply reservoir, but unlike others, it was constructed on the main stem of the river. In 1921, the reservoir. Lake Decatur, was placed on the Sangamon River to accommodate growing water needs of the A. E. Staley Company, one of the city's chief industries and destined to become one of the nation's largest grain processors. Considering the tons of sediment, which poured through the river's channels from thousands of acres of highly cultivated upstream areas, a mainstream reservoir was a risky venture. Lake Springfield, further downstream, and also a combined water supply and recreational reservoir, had been placed on a tributary of the Sangamon River where siltation rates were considerably lower. The extent of Decatur's gamble was soon obvious. Between 1922 and 1936, the lake lost 14 per cent of its storage capacity. Thousands of tons of silt, carried by swift Sangamon flood- waters during the rainy season, settled in Lake Decatur. In 1946 the sediment was two feet deep near the dam and three feet deep in the upper part of the reservoir, up to the spillway level in some places. Large volumes of silt resulted from the intensified cultivation in the upstream drainage areas. In Piatt County, land planted with intertilled row crops such as corn and soy beans was increasing at a high rate. In 1953 and 1954 worries about a shrinking water supply were intensified by a drought which caused Lake Decatur to drop alarmingly. Future droughts were predicted by the Corps and concern developed over the city's ability to provide water for peak industrial demands. City leaders organized a search for more water and were advised by engineers that the most feasible plan was the construction of an upstream reservoir to serve as a silt trap. Decatur lobbyists
Farmers in upstream regions also
objected to the dam since there was the
risk of reservoir water backing up and
being held at high levels. Upstream
farmers were joined by residents in
Monticello, the Piatt County seat. In
Monticello there were objections to the
Corps' plans because of fears that a dam
on the Oakley site would cause flooding |
|
September 1976 / Illinois Issues / 5
Conservationists fought
the dam to save Allerton
Park and found an ally in
farmers who felt their
land was more threatened
by the dam than by floods
near the city and damage the municipal
sewage system. There was little confidence that the Corps could manage the
reservoir to prevent floodwater backups. Congressman William Springer
(R., Champaign), after considering the
strong opposition, told Decatur's leaders that it would take a miracle to get
Oakley started. The push for Oakley had more going
for it in 1954. Economic conditions were
changing in Illinois, and agricultural
interests were overshadowed by the
compelling demands for industrial
expansion. Decatur was regarded by
some as the industrial gateway to central
Illinois, and its needs in a growing state
economy assumed greater importance.
Primarily interested in its own problems, Decatur lobbied for federal
approval of a water supply function in
Oakley's design. This time, there was
strong congressional support for Oakley. The late U.S. Sen. Everett Dirksen
(R., Pekin) never doubted the Corps
claims for Oakley or Decatur's need,
and U.S. Sen. Paul Douglas (D.,
Chicago) agreed that with some changes
there could be a reservoir. Planners in
the Chicago district office of the Corps,
which had jurisdiction over the Sangamon River development, were very
receptive to Decatur's overtures, especially since the Chicago office had yet to
build a major reservoir project. Decatur's lobbying efforts were successful, and Congressman Springer's
doubtful miracle occurred. A revised
Oakley project was launched in 1956
with a new price tag of $22.8 million and
a Decatur agreement to pay a share
($5.4 million) of the cost. Rosy predictions for sudden wealth in central
Illinois did not convince everyone, and
objections continued to impede progress. The Korean War slowed down
federal public works spending, but
persistent political pressure overcame
all obstacles. In 1962, a new Oakley
design was approved, this time at a cost
of $27.2 million. Recreation was added
as a benefit at the insistence of Sen.
Douglas. Jubilant about the prospect of
Oakley's success, a Decatur city councilman said, "We've got a lake for about
half the price we would have to pay for
one of our own. The determination of
the Decatur Association of Commerce
and the City Council carried on through
war, indifference and opposition."
Throughout the entire Oakley controversy, Decatur's approach was characterized by this same tough single-mindedness. Even when the odds turned
decisively against the project, city
leaders refused to admit the possibility
of defeat and fought to the very end.
More resentment
More specific objections related to
topography. The land, it was said, was
too flat for water storage. With high
rates of runoff, it was necessary to take
the reservoir too far back into the watershed, using an excessive amount of
highly developed agricultural land.
Critics also said that Oakley's flood
control function would be useless
because Decatur's industrial needs
required a full reservoir at all times.
High water levels were also needed
during summer months when there were
peak demands for recreation. A full
reservoir contradicted the flood control
concept which required summer and fall
drawdowns to lower water levels for the
accommodation of late winter and
spring floods. Furthermore, farmers
claimed high reservoir levels would
permanently damage farm drainage
systems and keep the land soggy during
critical periods of the growing season.
Many downstream farmers were willing
to take occasional losses from flooding
because the losses were more than made
up by high yields from rich bottomland
soils. A dam at Oakley would curtail
flooding, but farmers feared that the
lower Sangamon River would be much
too high during the planting season.
Reservoir management was known to
be difficult, and water releases often
took longer than predicted. Downstream farmers feared the long period of
soaking more than they feared floodwaters, which drained, away in a few
weeks time each spring. Oakley opponents pointed out that agencies such as
the Corps, which construct, operate and
maintain multi-purpose resource projects are required to build only projects
which yield public benefits. It was
argued that since flood benefits alone
could not justify Oakley, the Corps
needed to count the benefits of water
supply and recreation to bolster a
sagging cost-benefit ratio.
Following congressional approval,
the 1962 version of Oakley was a reality
for opposition forces to contend with.
Voices of protest were again heard, but
this time more technical arguments were
offered. There was also resentment
against a project designed solely for
Decatur and Macon County, and there
was criticism that the more costly
project had not been put to the test of
public hearings. Farmers and conservationists again advanced alternative
proposals to provide cheaper and more
efficient methods of flood control.
Some critics thought the new dam
should be located below Decatur,
downstream where it would be more
protected from siltation. There, they
said, it would truly serve a flood control
purpose by containing flood waters
from the city. Most opponents were
suspicious of the Corps' motives. They
believed that the Chicago District,
anxious to build its first major reservoir,
selected the Oakley site because the
combined benefits of water supply,
flood control and recreation made the Oakley package more attractive. Critical of the Corps' decision, opponents
claimed the Corps' attitude was not,
"Where is the best place to put a dam?"
but instead, "How can we put a dam
here?"
Further enlargement
During 1964 and 1965, there were
widespread rumors that the Corps,
having difficulty with its cost-benefit
ratio, was planning to add a new
purpose and enlarge the reservoir.
Officials from the University of Illinois,
6 / September 1976 / Illinois Issues
with little information about the possible effects of flooding in Allerton Park under the 1962 Oakley design, were alarmed that a larger dam would bring even more water. Objections were made to Congressman Springer that Oakley planning was proceeding too rapidly. The congressman gave assurances that the university would receive step-by-step notices of project development, but in spite of his assurances, Oakley planning continued to be secret.
Speculation about Oakley ended in 1966 when Congressman Springer announced that Oakley had been doubled in size at an estimated cost of $62.4 million. Corps officials described the changes as mere refinements. But by raising the dam 15 feet from 621 above mean sea level to 636 feet, adding a new feature as well as channelization, they had, in effect, given the project a major overhaul. The new feature, low flow augumentation, was the addition of more water to dilute polluted water downstream from Decatur, Since the impoundment of the Sangamon River by Lake Decatur in 1921, the river's flow immediately downstream from Decatur sometimes consisted of little more than effluent from Decatur's sanitary plant. This new purpose of dilution immediately became a target of Oakley opponents who regarded it as a crutch to support the project's weak economic structure.
The Corps' decision to redesign Oakley without the benefit of public hearings further aggravated opposition, and the stage was set for one of the longest political battles in Illinois history.
Subsequently, the struggle was carried into courtrooms, legislative chambers and council rooms at the federal, state and local levels. The Corps of Engineers, with everything to gain, resisted demands for changes. The Committee for Allerton Park (COAP), with nothing to lose, refused to give up its efforts to save the park. It is possible that if the compromise had stuck together, the Oakley Dam project would have been accepted. What is certain is that a small group of citizens, which used every lever of publicity and political power, finally succeeded in bringing the weight of public opinion and official sanction against the project and its powerful bureaucratic sponsor.
Next month — Oakley: the early years.
September 1976 / Illinois Issues / 7