THIRD IN A SERIES OF FOUR ARTICLES By BRITTA B. HARRIS
A Lincoln housewife, and mother of five,
Ms. Harris followed and researched the
events of the Oakley Dam controversy for
seven years in order to write her master's
thesis in public administration for
the University of Illinois at Urbana.
She has also taught political science at
Lincoln College.
IN SPITE OF predicted upstream damages in Piatt County and in Allerton Park, a property owned by the University of Illinois, the plans of the U.S. Corps of Engineers for the construction of Oakley Dam near Decatur grew more ambitious throughout the 1960's. The federal agency announced in 1966 a new plan which doubled the size of earlier plans. From 1962 to 1966, the project increased in area by 219 percent, from 6,700 acres to 21,300 acres, and in cost from $27.2 million to $62.4 million.
The projected expansion of the reservoir improved public benefits and guaranteed more political support. The Illinois Department of Business and Economic Development was enthusiastic about Oakley as an attraction for tourists as well as a factor to promote industrial development. Federal officials and the Illinois Department of Conservation encouraged a larger, deeper lake for better recreation, and more water to dilute pollution downstream from Decatur was urged by the Illinois Department of Public Health.
Behind the Oakley scene was a group of civilian staffers in the Corps' district office in Chicago who were determined to build the dam as their first major reservoir project. A procession of military officers who served as district engineers automatically promoted the project. That Oakley was to be built was established policy, and succeeding colonels, briefed by the staff, rose to Oakley's defense. Corps' officials repeatedly emphasized intentions to listen to and cooperate with all interests in the affected area, but they turned away from claims made by Piatt County residents and the University of Illinois. The Corps' negative attitude was most apparent in its relations with the Committee of Allerton Park(COAP), a citizens' committee formed to save the University facility for its prized scientific, educational and cultural purposes, Not until it was able to manifest popular strength did the COAP have any real leverage in Oakley planning.
Opposition arguments produced some congressional response. Democratic Sen. Paul Douglas said that he tried to exercise some scrutiny over Corps' projects as they developed, but that control by the engineers over details was practically unlimited. Douglas exhibited a cautious willingness to help Piatt County, and he also recognized that the expansion of Oakley would conflict with research activities at Allerton Park. The problem was difficult for him since he had insisted that more recreation benefits be included in the project. He was also committed to Decatur's search for more water. Republican Congressman William Springer, who was more closely identified with project planning, also responded to his Piatt constituents, but he tried to impress them with the economic possibilities of a larger lake. Rejecting accusations that Oakley was solely for Decatur water, Springer insisted that flood control for downstream agricultural benefits was Oakley's major justification. He said the reservoir was one of 16 projects in a grand plan to control the entire Illinois tributary system. As far as he was concerned, the conservation of downstream farms overrode any concern for Allerton which he described as an "impenetrable jungle."
At the University, there were divisions of opinion among members of the faculty and administration. Some saw Oakley advantages; others wanted to establish Allerton Park as a valid public interest. University President David Henry, in the middle, valued Allerton Park but did not want to be at cross-purposes with Decatur. Some University scientists were suspicious of the
November 1976 / Illinois Issues / 21
The U. of I. faded
under political pressure,
and in 1966
the Committee on
Allerton Park rose up
to fight the dam
Corps' cost-benefit figures. They had little confidence in the Corps' justification
of benefits for low flow augmentation
using water to dilute Decatur's sewage.
Professor Lawrence Bliss, a University
botanist, told President Henry that the
University's excellent position in environmental studies could not be maintained without Allerton's research
facilities. Professor S. C. Kendeigh,
chairman of the University's Committee
on Natural Areas, emphasized the value
of Allerton for environmental study.
The new Oakley design, Kendeigh said,
would place 90 per cent of the University's experiments, some reaching back
30 years, under two feet of water. The
Corps' Oakley studies were regarded
skeptically by University scientists, and
it was asserted that no examination of
underground water supplies for Decatur's use had been made. Regarding
evidence supporting sewage dilution for
Decatur, scientists accused the Corps of
proving a point by gathering data, which
could provide no other answers. University scientists, joined by the
Illinois Natural History Survey and the
Illinois Nature Preserves Commission,
termed Oakley an ecological disaster.
Their questioning drew political pressure as well as objections from Clarence
Klassen, chief of the State Division of
Sanitary Engineering. Klassen, who had
been instrumental in setting new high
water quality standards in Illinois, had
long favored restoration of the Sangamon River whose flow had been blocked
by Lake Decatur for over 40 years.
Klassen was disturbed that any state
agency would take a position contrary
to the pro-Oakley policies expressed by
the state administration. He said that
Allerton's research facilities could not
be measured against the values of water
supply and quality. Demands for a study of Oakley
alternatives began to have some effect at federal levels, but when it became
apparent that the Corps was hesitating.
Decatur City councilman, Henry Bolz,
warned against any slowdowns. He said
the value of Oakley to sport, health and
conservation was evident, but that the
key to she project was Decatur water.
Bolz also hinted Decatur might pull out
and look for other sources of water.
Confident of their position, Decatur
leaders knew that without the city
sharing part of the expense, the project's
ratio of cost to value was too thin. Pressure was put on the state to push
for Oakley's progress and Gov. Otto
Kerner turned to the state Technical
Advisory Committee (TAC), a group of
state agencies assigned to coordinate
state activities in water resource development. Of the nine TAC agencies,
the Department of Business and Economic Development (BED) was the first
among equals- Eugene Graves, head of
both the BED and TAC, urged the
group to approve a letter to the Corps
pledging state support for the higher
dam. The TAC sent the letter, but the
decision was not unanimous. John
Guillou, chief of the Illinois Division of
Waterways, protested to Gov. Kerner's
office that since his agency had never
been requested to prepare a position
relative to Oakley, it was exceedingly
difficult for him to justify the state's
endorsement. Ben Ewing, director of the
state's Water Resources Center, objected to the way Graves had dictated
state support. Graves said it was the
Department of Health, which had suggested Oakley changes and that with the
larger lake, there would be a better
chance for a new state park in Central
Illinois. As far as he was concerned, the
matter was closed.
TAC letter stiffens opposition
The University's official decision, in
October 1966, to give up, marked the end of a weak University effort to save
Allerton Park, Reacting to the capitulation,
a group of University faculty
members and Champaign area citizens
organized the Committee on Allerton
Park (C'OAP). The new committee
regarded Oakley as a typical pork barrel
project. It had all the indispensable
ingredients: a zealous chamber of
commerce, a sympathetic congressman
and the Corps of Engineers. Convinced
that Oakley was being built for the
benefit of Decatur's grain processors,
the COAP vowed to prove that the
project involved social costs, which were
greater than any claimed benefits.
The TAC letter had a serious impact
upon University deliberations. The
administration had hoped for more time
to study alternatives. Trying to chart a
course for the University to follow was
difficult since administration officials
were denied a copy of the Corps'
preliminary "General Design Memorandum" for Oakley. The Corps told the
University there was little that could be
done to protect Allerton. Persuaded
that further attempts to change the
project were futile, the University Board
of Trustees acknowledged that Oakley
would be for the public's benefit.
Considering other matters, such as University negotiations with the Corps
for a large research facility near the
campus, the Board found itself in a
delicate position. Later, Waiter Keith
director of Allerton Park, cited the
University's decision as proof that
environmental issues should be handled
on a broader basis where political
influence would be less significant.
COAP questions Oakley benefits
The COAP also complained to John
Guillou about the use of the Sangamon
River for sewage dilution. Guillou
agreed that the COAP had a valid case. The state waterways chief objected to
Corps' procedures in water resource
The COAP called upon its members
and professional experts to examine
each Oakley benefit. One by one, in
press releases, interviews, and a variety
of publications, the benefits were torn
apart. The COAP argued that Decatur
should take care of us sewage problems
with advanced waste treatment. Recreation, it was asserted, was overrated in
Oakley's plans since there would be no
boating or swimming. Summer drawdowns, creating obnoxious mudflats,
would discourage most recreation.
Flood control was also questioned,
Bruce Hannon, COAP leader, said
Oakley offered only 15 per cent flood
protection downstream and that the whole project was trumped up to make more upstream dams inevitable. The COAP recognized Decatur's water problem but recommended drilling wells for a supplemental municipal
supply. Aiming at what they regarded as
the project's Achilles' heel, the COAP
accused the Corps of not meeting
congressional requirements for returns on public investments.
22 / November 1976 / Illinois Issues
development as being autocratic., regimented and mission-oriented. He said (hat Illinois was not adaptable to their programs since there were too few deep water sites, and developing reservoirs on flat land was not a good idea Guillou sought the governor's approval of a plan which would bring federal, state and local officials together for compromise discussions. He was convinced that water quality should be dropped as a project benefit. Guillou agreed with Oakley opponents about the feasibility of alternatives, and he advised the University not to take the Corps' word as gospel. He felt it would be difficult to persuade the Corps to lower the pool's elevation, but he was certain that it could be done with an increase in benefits.
U. of I. reenters the fray
Evidence collected by a University
committee investigating the impact of
Oakley on Allerton Park added to the
movement to seek additional technical
assistance. As a result of the committee's
efforts, the University Board of Trustees
hired the Harza Engineering firm of
Chicago. It was a significant move
which promised to introduce some hard
facts which the Corps could not easily
dismiss. Corps' officials were unhappy
about this development, but they had
failed to realize that growing doubts
about Oakley stemmed, in part, from their own continued refusal to share information. For those searching for compromise,
tiara's report, released in May 1968,
seemed to offer some hope. The engineering consultants told University
officials that. Allerton was not a lost
cause, the Harza report gave a substantial boost to University claims and
assured Allerton partisans that the
University could be counted on to
defend the park. In the report, the Corps
was challenged to prove that Oakley planning met established professional
standards of land and water management. Harza's engineers thought there
were less expensive means for flood
control. The report proposed a supplemental reservoir at Friend's Creek,
upstream from Oakley, to store water
for sewage dilution and to allow a lower
Oakley pool level. For Decatur's water
supply, Harza engineers suggested the
combined use of a ground water supply
system which could be coordinated with
the surface water system during drought
periods. To reduce sedimentation storage volume, a program of watershed erosion control was mentioned. In May 1968, congressional hearings provided a platform for the first public
confrontation between the Oakley-Allerton forces. Both sides realized that
growing opposition had placed Oakley's
appropriation in a sensitive position.
The pro-Oakley group included officials
from the Corps, the state and a large
delegation from Decatur. The anti-Oakley group included representatives
from Piatt County and the COAP.
Speaking for Decatur, Attorney Thomas Samuels, a leader in the city's
chamber of commerce, said Oakley
would provide opportunities for
10,000,000 people living within a half-day's drive of the reservoir. He saw no
legitimate objection to Oakley and said
that only a small percentage of Allerton's visitors ever saw the bottomlands.
Basic to the testimony of Oakley's
opponents was the contention that, until
the 1968 hearings, the people of the
upper Sangamon Valley had not been
able to publicly present their views.
Professor Lawrence Bliss testified that
engineers, politicians and other decision-makers needed to be educated
about the consequences of their decisions. Most Oakley opponents were
satisfied with the hearings, but one COAP leader pessimistically commented, "Nobody in government listens to you unless you hit them with a brick." COAP members had a busy year in 1968. They kept the Oakley-Allerton
issue in the news with a variety of
publicity campaigns including a statewide petition to save the park. Oakley's
defenders in Decatur countered with
similar publicity campaigns. The total
effect was to expose the public to a
variety of facts revealing the complexities of a public works project which had
once seemed simple. Although Allerton
forces had widespread popular support,
they did not have the political influence
of their Decatur counterparts. The
COAP had yet to reach the three men
who could save Allerton Park, Sens.
Everett Dirksen and Charles Percy and
Congressman William Springer. The COAP, looking for official
influence, engaged in political activities
during the 1968 Illinois election campaign. Both Richard Ogilvie, a Republican running for governor and Attorney General William dark, a Democrat running for the U.S. Senate, were
candidates in need of issues, dark was
strong on environmental issues, and, at
first, favored Allerton's cause. The issue
did not help his campaign, and he soon
declared that water for Decatur was
essential. Working both sides of the
political fence, the COAP was able to
convince Ogilvie that there was a
compelling need to settle the long
dispute. With Ogilvie's election, the
COAP believed that John Guillou's
suggestions for a state-sponsored compromise would gain administrative approval.
In 1967, newly elected University Trustee Ralph Hahn, a Springfield
engineer, asked the Board to reopen the
Oakley-Allerton matter. Hahn and
other University officials, in meetings
with the Corps, found that engineers
refused to share information. Put off by
the Corps' stubborn attitude, Hahn was
certain that the only effective way to
deal with the Corps was to acquire an
independent source of engineering data.
Hahn was sure that the Corps would
eventually be amenable to Oakley
alternatives if some official way could
be found to authorize changes. The
University trustee believed that the
Corps, not accustomed to dealing with
environmental concerns, had been
backed into a corner on Oakley. He was
certain that Decatur would go along
with changes, especially if the project
included another reservoir upstream
from Oakley. It was also known that
members of the congressional delegation were eager to end a conflict, which
was becoming difficult to handle.
Decatur questions State Water Survey
The move for an Oakley review was
strengthened by an Illinois State Water
Survey report made public in August
1968 which established incontestably
that underground water sources to
supply Decatur were available. These
sources were not sufficient, however, to
dilute Decatur sewage which flowed
into the Sangamon. The Illinois State
Water Survey regarded such a use as a
threat to area water supplies. Officials
estimated privately that the cost of the
underground water would be about
$2,500,000, compared to the $5,590,000
which Decatur had agreed to pay for
water from Oakley. The Corps asked
Decatur to reevaluate its municipal
water needs, and the city responded with
a letter disputing the reports of both
Harza and the Illinois State Water
November 1976 / Illinois Issues / 23
Survey. Decatur City Manager Robert Semple said the underground supplies were for emergency use only. The Corps subsequently denounced suggestions for the use of underground water. John Guillou, however, noted that Decatur could develop available ground water sources more economically than it could develop a long-term water supply on the Sangamon River.
Gov. Ogilvie's mail ran heavily in favor of a compromise, and John Guillou persuaded the administration that a compromise was both possible and necessary. Continued opposition and a new, higher project cost of $70 million were bound to have a negative effect on congressional appropriations subcommittees. Pro-Oakley forces tried to break the gathering momentum for compromise, but the state was now determined to find some middle ground. The situation became more complicated when the Corps announced that it was considering, among several alternatives, the possibility of raising Oakley (again!) from 636 feet to 641 feet (above sea level). The COAP, anticipating a failure in compromise efforts, began exploring possibilities for legal action against the Corps.
Decatur backers were determined to influence the impending compromise towards their side, and great pressure was directed at the state administration. However, newly appointed state Director of Public Works and Buildings William Cellini backed up by what seemed to be a feasible technical alternative to Oakley prepared by Guillou, was in a good position to persuade Decatur to accept. Cellini said Decatur did not realize that anti-Oakley arguments had convinced Washington not to move unless there were some modifications. Decatur Attorney Thomas Samuels advised Cellini that they didn't care how high or how low the dam was as long as Oakley's basic purposes were not emasculated. If the project failed, Samuels told Cellini that resistance to the project could do the University incalculable harm. During 1968, partisans from both sides engaged in hot verbal battles which shed little light on the issues. Samuels accused the University of succumbing to "the Big Lie," and Bruce Hannon labelled the Corps' work "a mass of deception."
Following several private meetings between the state and Decatur at which some hard bargaining took place, the state was prepared to present a plan to the University which "Decatur would buy." By May 27, 1969, a verbal agreement between all parties was reached. The compromise overcame two problems which had plagued Oakley: the lack of state participation and the division of public opinion. The Corps endorsed the meeting of interests but reserved the privilege of examining the plan before stating its position.
The state offers a compromise
The Waterways Alternative was the
light before the storm. The 1969 congressional hearings proceeded without a
hitch, and state officials felt they had
done their job well. But before long, the
same old problems surfaced in a new
area. Citizens in the rural community of
Argenta, close to the proposed Friend's Creek Reservoir, were dismayed that a
new project had been suggested without
consulting them or considering possible
damage to their farm and village
drainage systems. Angry citizens would
not be mollified by state assurances; they believed that farms would be
damaged and divided, that the village
would have flooding problems and that
a school district would be split in half by
the reservoir. Matters took another bad turn when
the University learned that the state
intended to alter the Waterways Alternative. Walter Keith asked John
Guillou to explain changes planned by
the state. Keith was concerned that
piecemeal changes, in the aggregate,
could be substantial. Guillou maintained that there was no real change in
the state's position since the state had
never really expected the Corps to
accept the Waterways Alternative in
detail. A skeptical University decided to
withhold project approval pending further review. As far as COAP members were
concerned, the agreement was broken.
They vowed to reject any agreement
which did not have the force of taw. The
Allerton partisans moved to a more
aggressive strategy and urged the
University to do the same. Bruce
Hannon, resuming his attacks on the
Corps' flood control benefit, said that
the Corps had made an error in design
which amounted to $1,000,000 and
reduced Oakley flood control justification to a shambles. The University did
not share the COAP's desire to discredit
the Corps, and stood aside from COAP
activities, preferring to wait for the
Corps' report on the Waterways Alternative. Commenting on the Oakley epic,
Illinois State Water Survey Chief
William Ackerman said, "It has been a
fascinating struggle to observe, and yet a
costly way for society to work its will."
The Corps' review of the compromise
was strictly an internal affair. No one
knew what the engineers would do, but
everyone was certain that Oakley's
water level would again be raised.
Allerton backers were bitterly disappointed by false hopes raised by the state
compromise, and Oakley partisans
worried about delays in Oakley's schedule, and Oakley had been on the Corps'
drawing boards for 30 years, and there
was still a long way to go.
The 1969 compromise, called "The
Waterways Alternative," was estimated
to cost $7 million less than the Corps'
1966 design. There was more water for
Decatur with the addition of a tributary
reservoir at Friend's Creek. A bonus for
Central Illinois residents was a "green-belt" recreation area along the river
downstream from Decatur. The COAP
was appeased by a lower conservation
pool at 621 feet and by the fact that
diluting Decatur's sewage had been left
out. However, the environmentalist
group warned that its continued cooperation hinged upon the maintenance
of the pool at 621 feet and a 7,000 cubic
foot-per-second reservoir release rate,
which would protect the park from
floods. The University also made it clear
that its approval was based on the
Waterways Alternative, and that any
changes would lead to a withdrawal of
support. Walter Keith advised the
University administration to watch the
situation and to continue collecting
data. In Decatur, there was also an air of
caution.
To be concluded next month.
24 / November 1976 / Illinois Issues