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A tough look By James C. Kozlowski, J.D. In the case of Ostergren v. Forest Preserve District of Will County, 118 Ill.App.3d 319, 73 Ill.Dec. 824, 454 N.E.2d 1073 (1983), plaintiff Richard Ostergren sued the forest preserve district for negligently "maintaining and supervising the forest preserve for use by snowmobilers." Ostergren was seriously injured when "the snowmobile he was operating struck an excavation trench or mound at the Sauk Trail Forest Preserve and he was thrown from the snowmobile."
In response to Ostergren's complaint, the forest preserve argued any negligence cause of action was barred by section 5-1 (I) of the Illinois Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act. A pertinent part this this statute provides:
The trial court agreed that the statute barred Ostergren's suit and granted a summary judgment in favor of the forest preserve. Ostergren appealed. On appeal, the issue was whether it was constitutional to bar Ostergren's negligence suit based upon the statutory immunity conferred by the Snowmobile Act. Ostergren argued that the Snowmobile Act unconstitutionally denied him "his right to due process of law by totally extinguishing a common-law cause of action." Ostergren's constitutional argument, as characterized by the appeals court, was based upon the following:
The fundamental constitutional rights to which plaintiff's arguments are directed are succinctly stated in Article I, Section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws." The right of due process of law is found as well in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 further provides that "every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property and reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." Thus stated is the philosophy by which the plaintiff's charge of a statutory due process violation must be considered. As described by the appeals court, these provisions of the State constitution balance the rights of the individual against the right of the State to exercise its police power to preserve the public health, safety and welfare.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the appeals court found that a statute, like the Snowmobile Act which relieved the landowner of all liability without regard to the degree of negligence, violated the due process guarantees of the State and federal constitutions. Conversely, a state could constitutionally use its police power to enact a statute restricting negligence causes of action to those instances involving allegations of wilful or malicious landowner misconduct. In support of this conclusion, the appeals court cited the case of Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965), which declared a similar statute unconstitutional because it also denied any cause of action to the injured party:
Illinois Parks and Recreation 22 November/December 1984 In the opinion of the appeals court, a landowner immunity statute, like the Snowmobile Act, would be constitutional if it did "not preclude a cause of action to the injured party but changes the degree of fault necessary for a recovery from that of the common law." As written, the Illinois Snowmobile Act was found to be unconstitutional because it barred any negligence cause of action. Under this law, the injured party was denied any legal redress regardless of the degree of alleged landowner misconduct. Consequently, the appeals court concluded that "the statute is in violation of due process of the law and cannot be reconciled with Illinois' philosophy of non-destruction of remedies." According to the appeals court, the absolute immunity from suit provided by the Snowmobile Act failed to strike the proper balance between individual rights and state police power.
In our opinion, the rights of landowners/occupiers, generous enough to permit snowmobilers to use their property without charge, should be carefully weighed against the rights of snowmobilers who benefit from such landowners/occupiers. Absolute tort immunity regardless of the degree of fault on the landowner/occupier's part is not required to strike an appropriate balance. Absolute tort immunity deprives the injured party of an opportunity to be heard, destroys a remedy that existed at the common law, and cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The statutory provision as presently written is invalid. Based upon the above analysis, a constitutional revision of the Snowmobile Act would provide "a less comprehensive provision to protect landowners from claims for injuries caused to snowmobilers by ordinary negligence on the landowner's part." Presumably, such a statute would allow a cause of action in instances alleging wilful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the landowner. Having found the Illinois Snowmobile Act unconstitutional, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the forest preserve district and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Since this particular suit was no longer barred by the immunity provisions of the Snowmobile Act, the trial court on remand would have to consider Ostergren's allegations of negligence against the forest preserve district.
Illinois Parks and Recreation 23 November/December 1984 |
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