The state of the State

By CAROLYN BOIARSKY

A leaner Cat on the rebound

Joining the ranks of corporations with enigmatic names, Caterpillar Tractor Company became just plain Caterpillar Inc. as of May 22. The new name reflects the Big Cat's wide range of products and its interest in diversifying into non-manufacturing fields like financial services. Since April Cat has been negotiating a new labor contract with the United Auto Workers, trying to hammer out an agreement before the present contract expires this month. The union's bottom line is job security; the company's is freedom to make whatever cost reductions are necessary. Both Cat's new name and the new bottom lines in its current labor negotiations reflect a cost-cutting economic era where U.S. based manufacturing must compete with high technology and low-cost labor around the world. This article seeks to discover how the change came about, what Cat is trying to do about it and what may be in store for both Caterpillar Inc. and for central Illinois.

ILLINOIS' "Fat Cat" has gone on a crash diet. The company is getting leaner and trimmer by the day. Caterpillar Tractor Company began its menu of lean cuisine in 1982 and has been following a strict regimen ever since. Indeed, as the layoffs and shutdowns continue, many have begun to worry that the Big Cat may be developing a case of anorexia. Not so, say the company doctors. To compete in today's international price wars, Caterpillar must pare over 50 percent of its excess weight. At stake is the company's survival and its ability to continue as a vital growth industry.

In central Illinois where much of that excess weight is located, Cat's prescription is simple: To compete in today's markets it must cut production costs. At stake are the high wages and good jobs of the local labor force. For the nation as a whole Cat also has a prescription: To compete in today's global economy, the United States must cut its deficit, cut the costs of doing business and reward investors. At stake is its manufacturing base.

Caterpillar's new regimen is a response to the sudden devastating decline in profits which it recently experienced. In 1981 Caterpillar Tractor Company was one of the most successful heavy machinery manufacturers in the world. Then suddenly, a year later, it suffered losses of $179.9 million. The losses continued for three years. By 1984 they had grown to $428.5 million, reflecting a decline in sales of 6.5 percent.

What caused this multinational, multibillion dollar company to lose so much so fast?

Some say that the union killed Caterpillar, and some say it was the other way around with Cat attempting to kill the union and in the process mortally wounding itself. Still others claim that Cat had become complacent and lazy, that its quality and service had declined, thus providing an opening for its Japanese competitor, Komatsu. Finally, others perceive the low yen/high dollar as the key problem. The truth is that all of these scenarios are simply side effects of a new international economy in which U.S. firms and workers are pitted against firms and workers around the globe, not just those in the United States.

6/June 1986/Illinois Issues

Unions did not kill Caterpillar. When the United Auto Workers (UAW) called the 1982 strike, the longest strike in its history, Caterpillar was already wounded, its warehouses swelling with inventory. Caterpillar had been hit by the recession of 1981 in a way that it had never been hit before — not even during the Great Depression.

Reeling from recession

Until 1981 Caterpillar had been able to compensate for a recession in one part of the world by seeking business in more prosperous regions. The 1974 recession is a case in point. While other businesses suffered from OPEC's escalating oil prices, Caterpillar made money by selling its product to the very nations that had caused the recession. As a result Caterpillar was able to keep Illinois insulated against the nation's economic downswings.

But in 1981 there was no one to sell to. The recession was worldwide. This time Caterpillar could not protect Illinois. Far from being a cause of Cat's troubles, the UAW strike provided the company with a golden opportunity to save money while waiting out the crisis. The question of whether it was a "company-called strike," as the union declared, was irrelevant. Had the union not called the strike, Caterpillar would have had to begin mass layoffs. The strike probably saved Cat the cost of unemployment insurance.

Local 974 of the UAW is the major union representing Caterpillar's employees. In 1979 it had 32,900 members, making it the second largest local in the nation. Competing with their counterparts in Detroit, who represent the automotive workers, local UAW leaders also vied with Cat's management for high salaries, good benefits, favorable working conditions and control of the work force. Although Caterpillar, like most U.S. industries, has had an adversarial relationship with its union, it was able for 40 years to provide its workers with a good portion of their demands. In 1984 the average worker in one of Caterpillar's U.S. plants made $22.49 an hour in wages and fringe benefits. The latter usually included dental and optometric insurance as part of a health insurance package; other benefits included vacation leave and a bonus for perfect attendance.

The good wages and benefits created a high standard of living for Cat's employees. Blue-collar workers often made as much as white-collar workers in other industries; company janitors made as much as some central Illinois teachers. Thus blue-collar workers were able to enjoy an "upper middle-class" quality of life replete with symphony tickets and Caribbean cruises. What was good for Cat was obviously good for its employees.

But what was good for Cat's employees was not so good for local businesses competing with Cat for workers. Small central Illinois firms found it almost impossible to keep good, steady employees. They knew that many of those they hired also had an application pending at Caterpillar and would go as soon as Cat called. Since Cat's unwritten hiring practices often required immediate acceptance, many a businessman walked into his office in the morning to discover that his janitor, secretary or bookkeeper had gone to work for Cat. Unwilling or unable to compete with a wage scale that cut sharply into profits, some firms left central Illinois for places like Fort Smith, Ark., where workers were happy simply to have a job.

The high wage and benefit scale also prevented central Illinois from attracting new industry and thus diversifying its economic base. Unable to compete with Caterpillar's pay scale, smaller companies including several fairly sizable insurance firms refused to locate in the Peoria area, knowing that as soon as they had trained a good secretary, she would probably leave for greener pastures at the big "C."

Caterpillar recognized early that the high wages and benefits it paid its U.S. workers would hurt its ability to compete in a world market. In 1961, 20 years before the company's recent losses, then-chairman Harmon Eberhard cautioned that if wages continued to skyrocket, a time would come when the United States would lose its edge in the overseas market, thereby shrinking the demand for its product and causing a drastic reduction in the work force. In a letter to employees regarding an upcoming contract he wrote of the need to "hold the line on wages and salaries" to "enable us to compete more effectively against foreign manufacturers." He saw the company's ability to compete in an international market resulting in "more Caterpillar sales outside the U.S. and greater security for Caterpillar employees in this country," but he warned that "American companies and employees in our industry must choose between higher wages on the one hand and more job security on the other. They cannot have both."

Eberhard's warning was prophetic. In 1984 as the nation emerged from three years of recession, Cat's sales were down to $6.5 billion from $9.2 billion. The worldwide work force had been reduced by about 33 percent to approximately 61,000 employees from a high of 89,000 in 1979.

In central Illinois the cuts were even more drastic; layoffs amounted to approximately 50 percent of the 1979 work force. In addition the company consolidated operations at a number of central Illinois plants and was planning to close several of them, thus auguring further reductions in the work force. Those who were still on the payrolls found themselves working overtime. This was a far cry from the old days when many Caterpillar managers had opportunities to spend company time working on community projects, and hourly workers — according to industry scuttlebutt — had spent company time in the men's rooms spacing out their work.

Had the union not called the strike,
Caterpillar would have had to begin mass layoffs.
The strike probably saved Cat the cost
of unemployment insurance

In 1984 Caterpillar found itself in a market very different from the prerecession one. Construction activity had declined throughout the world; many countries were no longer engaged in large projects. Price had become a key factor in determining the winner of a contract, and Caterpillar's prices were way out of line. The list price of a D6 Caterpillar tractor, for example, was $15,000, while its West German equivalent sold for $9,000; Caterpillar's D8 tractor listed at approximately $32,500, 33 percent higher than a similar tractor by Komatsu of Japan.

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High labor costs are one of the major reasons for Cat's higher prices. Caterpillar estimates its labor costs are approximately 50 to 60 percent higher than Japan's. In other countries the discrepancy may be even greater. According to James O'Connor, who formerly served as president of UAW Local 974 in East Peoria, workers in a South Korean plant, which has a dirt floor and no central heat, receive wages as low as $1.64 per hour for work similar to that done by a Caterpillar employee.

The large differential in worldwide wages and working conditions presents a major problem for the United States. In order for U.S. businesses to compete, they are going to have to acquire cheaper labor. This means a choice: Either U.S. workers are willing to earn less and work under less favorable conditions, or U.S industries such as Caterpillar will leave the country to manufacture their products. Neither alternative presents a pretty picture. As O'Connor comments, "American labor is not going to be willing to return to third world conditions." Yet U.S. workers may be displaced by cheaper foreign workers if companies are forced to go overseas.

Cost is the bottom line for Caterpillar.
The company says it will keep its
plants open and 'out-source' locally
only if it is cost effective to do so

The UAW suggests that the federal government can solve the problem by establishing a protectionist policy and slapping tariffs on foreign imports, thus protecting U.S. products that are priced higher because of higher labor costs. But Dick Kahler, Caterpillar's manager for government affairs — admitting that Caterpillar's sole objective is not "to preserve jobs in hometown U.S.A." — strongly disagrees. He says that a protectionist policy would reduce Caterpillar's foreign sales because other nations would retaliate by placing stricter limits on exports from the United States. And Caterpillar, whose overseas sales even now are close to 50 percent of total sales, can't afford to lose even a small portion of that market. Furthermore, a decline in Caterpillar's overseas market would cause job losses in the United States since approximately 31,000 U.S.-based jobs are dependent on Caterpillar exports.

Cat's products would not be the only ones to suffer from a protectionist policy. Kahler points out, "There is nothing more vulnerable than soy beans and corn" — both major Illinois exports. Instead of protectionism and the closing of foreign markets, Caterpillar would like to see the federal government use its leverage to open more world markets and deal with trade barriers through the U.S. Trade Act of 1984.

'Sourcing'

There is another solution, domestic cost reduction, exemplified by Caterpillar's manufacturing plant in Davenport, Iowa. Originally Caterpillar had decided to close the plant and transfer production to Glasgow, Scotland. This past January, however, Caterpillar announced that it would keep the Davenport facility open. Instead of totally "foreign sourcing" its D6 crawler tractor, Cat decided that the tractor would be only "half-sourced," with Davenport manufacturing those tractors to be sold in the United States and Glasgow producing those for the European market. ("Sourcing" or "out-sourcing" is a word that is getting a lot of use these days. It means to subcontract with another company to manufacture or assemble parts for a product or one or more models of a line of products. In the Davenport case, it applied to the manufacture of several models of track-type loaders and the D6 crawler.)

What happened to trigger this change? With the weakening of the U.S. dollar, the strengthening of the Mexican peso and a drastic reduction in costs by the Davenport plant, it became more cost effective to manufacture the tractors in the United States than to ship them in from Europe. Almost simultaneously with the announcement that it would maintain the Davenport plant, however, Caterpillar announced plans to close its plant in Bettendorf, Iowa, because of its failure to reduce costs sufficiently. Work done at Bettendorf — remanufacturing engines and components — will now be consolidated with work at a Caterpillar facility in Mississippi where labor costs are lower because there is no union.

Cost is the bottom line for Caterpillar. The company says it will keep its plants open and "out-source" locally only if it is cost effective to do so.

Apparently this policy is working. After suffering three years of losses, Caterpillar returned to profitability in 1985. Final figures for that year show an operating profit of 2 percent, and although profit projections for 1986 are moderate, the company is predicting that it will continue to improve financially. "If we can get our costs down, our profits will increase," says Caterpillar president Pete Donis.

Indeed, cost cutting may be the only way for Cat to make a profit in sluggish post-recession markets. The company's 1985 margin was largely a "paper profit" achieved by cutting costs rather than increasing volume. Cat's sales actually declined in the United States in 1985 and showed only modest growth overseas.

In short, improved profitability dose not mean that Caterpillar will rehire laid-off workers, or that it will be more willing to negotiate with the union for higher wages when the contract comes up for renewal this month, or that it will use higher priced U.S. sources for manufacturing part of its line or parts for its models. Rather, Caterpillar will continue to search for and implement cost-cutting measures — measures that will not help Illinois as the company engages in global shopping for cheaper ways to manufacture its product. Only if Illinois businesses and labor are competitive will Caterpillar give them its business.

It is not impossible. The Davenport plant, a subsidiary of Caterpillar, proved it could be done. Local firms to which Caterpillar has been out-sourcing, such as Morton Metalcraft, have also figured out ways to be competitive. Caterpillar chairman George Schaeffer comments, "If Davenport can do it, why can't everyone else?"

By cutting costs and prices, local suppliers ranging from printers to parts manufacturers can attract other customers besides Caterpillar. Now that Cat's high wages and large contracts no longer dominate central Illinois, the region has become competitive with other parts of the nation, making Peoria and other cities in the region more attractive locations for new firms.

8/June 1986/Illinois Issues

How Cat got to where it's at

BEHIND Caterpillar Tractor company's frugal strategy for economic recovery is a major shift in economic power. No longer does the world revolve around the technical know-how and industrial might of the U.S. firm and its U.S. workers. Within the last five years, the United States' technical edge has been reduced to insignificance, and its industries have been forced to compete in a shrinking market with others throughout the world.

Illinois has borne the brunt of that competition. In order to cut prices, Caterpillar has drastically cut costs. The company is now manufacturing a large number of parts and related products outside of Illinois; it has laid off almost one-half of its Illinois work force and reduced the wage scale for many of those who remain.

The effects of Cat's "downsizing" and "employment adjustment" extend far beyond the layoffs themselves — which in Illinois number approximately 12,000. Caterpillar estimates that for every company worker laid off, two others outside the company whose jobs are dependent on supplying parts or services for Caterpillar also lose their jobs. While many of these workers live outside the state, the incomes and jobs of local doctors, beauticians and retailers are also affected. In Peoria, where two-thirds of the state's laid-off workers resided, the S & Ls, the construction industry and real estate have been hit hard. The change in the life-style of central Illinois workers has been radical. There is no longer a feeling of job security; padded jobs at good wages are nonexistent; the quality of life previously guaranteed by high salaries and good benefits, has suffered. No longer can blue-collar workers expect to take home a paycheck equal to what middle managers would earn in other parts of the country.

To properly interpret Cat's new regimen, we need to understand the company's history: how it grew from a national to a multinational corporation and how its many successes carried with them the seeds of some of Cat's and central Illinois' current problems.

The Caterpillar tractor was first developed in California in 1904, but from its inception the company perceived itself as more than simply a local manufacturer. Recognizing its potential for capturing not only a national but an international market, Caterpillar began looking for a more central location. The Midwest seemed ideal, not only because of its centrality but because its large agricultural base made it a natural market for Cat's tractors. For central Illinois the decision could not have been more propitious. Caterpillar moved in just as the whiskey barons were pulling out — thus preventing the kind of economic upheaval that is going on right now as Caterpillar itself pulls out from some parts of the state.

In 1909 the company did what it hopes some other firm will do with its empty training facility in downtown Peoria: It moved into a building in East Peoria that had been abandoned by the Colean Manufacturing Co. For the next 20 years Cat improved its product, expanded its sales — and profited. By 1929 the company had a work force of over 2,500 people, and sales had reached $51.8 million with profits in the 20 percent range. Cat continued to make profits until the middle of the Great Depression: In 1932 it reported losses totaling $1.6 million, 12.2 percent of sales. Fifty years would pass before the company in 1982 would report another loss. This time the dollar amount would be far higher, reaching $179.9 million, but the loss would represent only 2.8 percent of sales for that year.

It took Cat only a year to recover in the 1930s. By 1933 the company was on the rebound, showing a profit, though meager, of 2.5 percent. For the next seven years Caterpillar's profits averaged 15 percent; after 1937 they fell to an average of 10 percent and remained at that level for 45 years. Although 10 percent was a comparatively narrow profit margin, it was steady and so was growth. By 1964 sales hit the billion dollar mark; by 1981 they were at $10 billion. Caterpillar's foreign and domestic labor force also grew, reaching an all-time high in 1979 of over 89,000 employees.

During these growth years, the company opened 22 manufacturing plants in the United States and 14 overseas. It also established a vast and profitable international dealer network. By 1979 there were 216 independent overseas dealers with a combined worth of $3.6 billion and a work force of over 78,500 people — almost equaling mother Cat.

Caterpillar's growth from 1933 to 1982 was due to a combination of good management and high-quality product development coupled with foresight in marketing strategies and luck.

During both world wars, Caterpillar was exempted for the most part from having to retool because its tractors were needed by the Defense Department. This put the company in a strong position to sell its product on the national market when the United States returned to a peacetime economy. Sales boomed as the nation resumed highway construction and other projects.

Until the post World War II period, Caterpillar's growth had been limited to its main product — tractors. All this changed in the 1950s. Deciding to manufacture attachments as well as basic machines, Caterpillar expanded and decentralized its manufacturing base throughout the nation. In 1951 two wholly owned subsidiary plants were opened in Joliet and Milwaukee. Other plants followed within the decade in York, Pa., and in Decatur and Aurora.

Decentralization was not limited to the United States. After World War II the overseas market opened up for Caterpillar, enabling it to expand into the multinational corporation it is today. It was an expansion that lasted for almost 40 years and provided so vast a market that the company's overseas sales reached 57.1 percent of total sales in 1980. During those years foreign demand for Cat's products cushioned both the company and its employees from shocks in the U.S. economy. In recent years, however, overseas expansion began to have a new purpose: acquiring cheaper labor and parts for Caterpillar's tractors and engines at the expense of U.S. business and labor.

Caterpillar's postwar push to become an international corporation required new methods of financing and marketing. The Marshall Plan provided funds to war-torn western Europe to purchase construction equipment for rebuilding. Even with U.S. aid, however, the demand for Cat's equipment far exceeded its customers' ability to pay. Unwilling to forego potential sales because of a dearth of dollars, Caterpillar set out to find a solution. The company concluded that by providing the various countries with a way to obtain parts and services in their own currencies, it could free up dollars for purchasing the main equipment, which was manufactured in the United States. Caterpillar therefore decided to open several manufacturing plants overseas.

June 1986/Illinois Issues/9

The first foreign expansion occurred in England. In 1950 Cat located a parts depot in Leicester to provide, or "source," replacement parts that could be paid for in British pounds. Eight years later the company opened a manufacturing plant in Newcastle. These foreign plants were wholly owned subsidiaries of the parent company. Since then Caterpillar has opened other wholly owned manufacturing subsidiaries in Australia, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, France and Mexico.

Continuing its efforts to expand its international markets, Caterpillar developed a licensee agreement to overcome the dollar shortage in nations where it did not seem feasible to locate a plant. This arrangement freed up U.S. dollars for the purchase of Cat's large U.S.-made products and enabled the company to efficiently supply parts and services for its machines anywhere in the world. It was a system that endeared Caterpillar to its customers and kept them loyal when they upgraded or purchased equipment.

Postwar reconstruction was not the only task at hand. During the 1950s Venezuela initiated a comprehensive turnpike project; India began dam construction in Punjab; and Australia embarked on a vast irrigation project. All of these required U.S. construction equipment, and Caterpillar was at the forefront. In the early 1960s the company consolidated its overseas holdings under a new corporation, Caterpillar Overseas, S.A., with headquarters in Geneva. Caterpillar was now in name as well as deed a truly multinational corporation.

During its early years of expansion, Caterpillar had total control of its overseas manufacturing. By the 1960s, however, this type of sole proprietorship had become difficult to maintain because of rising nationalism and demands for some form of local control. In 1963 Caterpillar signed an agreement with Mitsubishi on a 50-50 ownership basis to produce its tractors in a plant just outside Tokyo. The decision gave Caterpillar an entry to the Far East, which had previously been sewed up by Komatsu and several smaller producers. The deal proved propitious: By 1971 Caterpillar's sales to Japan were 24 times those of 1963. A similar agreement was made between Caterpillar and an Indian corporation. In a slight variation, Caterpillar later entered into an agreement in Indonesia which split the ownership 80-20.

Agreements such as these signaled the beginning of a global economic system and of a growing domestic rift. By the 1980s shared ownership had resulted in the gradual erosion of Caterpillar's control over its overseas plants. Caterpillar's profits did not suffer from these agreements, but the union says that Cat's U.S. workers did. According to James B. O'Connor, former president of Local 974 of the United Auto Workers (the largest Peoria local negotiating with Caterpillar), a covert form of foreign control was exercised in France while Caterpillar was experiencing its third year of losses. O'Connor contends that the company laid off 100 East Peoria transmission workers and hired an additional 100 French workers to indicate its good intentions and to avoid a long investigation into its books by the French government during its period of retrenchment.

For over 40 years what was good for Caterpillar was also immediately and obviously good for central Illinois. Today that relationship is more complicated and more tenuous. Both Caterpillar and central Illinois are going in what appear to be opposite directions as they move outside the state's borders to improve their respective economic bases: Caterpillar to find a cheaper manufacturing base by out-sourcing many products overseas, the state to increase and diversify its industrial base by bringing overseas plants here. Perhaps eventually the paths will cross and once again the two entities will replenish each other, with Caterpillar finding it can out-source its products and services to those very plants which Illinois brings in.

Carolyn Boiarsky

Government cost-cutting

Because cost is the key factor, anything that state and local government can do to reduce costs would be beneficial to Caterpillar and to other Illinois businesses in their quest to become more competitive. Kahler suggests that reform is needed in such high-cost items as workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, environmental and workplace regulations, and taxes.

Illinois' workers' compensation and unemployment insurance are among the highest in the nation. While the benefits are good for the worker, the high cost raises the price of doing business in the state. Caterpillar would like to see these reduced, not only for its own sake but for the sake of potential local suppliers. Caterpillar would also like to see a reduction in insurance costs. The company is actively lobbying in Springfield for lower premiums for its product liability insurance and for its employees' health care.

State tax law is an area where Caterpillar would like to see changes that would give it some incentive to remain in Illinois. Kahler notes with some bitterness that while the state is offering tax breaks to new businesses moving into Illinois, it is not offering comparable benefits to those already here. Nor does Caterpillar feel Illinois provides sufficient tax credit for business conducted outside the state.

At the federal level, Caterpillar does not want tax reform that could hinder its efforts to compete, such as the proposed reductions in investment tax credits and in accelerated depreciation. Investment tax credits are especially important for Caterpillar because it is refitting its plants with the most modern technology available. Sufficient investment tax credits are also needed to induce investors to put money into the kinds of projects that use Caterpillar's construction machinery. In addition, investors must be able to depreciate their machinery purchases quickly. If they can no longer do that, there will be fewer construction projects and the market for Cat's products will shrink further. "Accelerated depreciation is the lifeblood of Caterpillar," according to Kahler.

10/June 1986/Illinois Issues

Although Caterpillar opposes tax reform that changes current incentives for the purchase of construction equipment, it does want reform of what Kahler calls "government disincentives" to cost cutting. As examples he cites the federal Clean Air Act and proposed workplace rules for cathode ray tubes (CRTs) in video display terminals and other high tech business equipment. In these areas government regulation has been "taken too far" and drives up costs, he says.

Finally, Kahler believes that the federal government must establish a stable economic policy and a consistent international trade policy if Caterpillar is to compete effectively both in the United States and abroad. The company perceives the federal deficit as one of the major causes of inequitable pricing between heavy manufacturers in the United States and those in other nations. For this reason Cat favors the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction act even though it would be adversely affected by cuts in defense and highway programs and in financing for the export/import bank. On the other hand, Caterpillar sees the embargo on exports to Libya as a deterrent to its overseas market, not because of its loss of Libyan sales but because the embargo causes other nations to perceive the United States as an unreliable supplier.

State tax law is an area where Caterpillar
would like to see changes that would give
it some incentive to remain in Illinois

If Caterpillar can get the kind of governmental assistance it wants and if it can continue to decrease its costs, it is confident that it will eventually flourish within Illinois. Such improvement is bound to be slow, however, since there is no expansion in the construction market in sight.

Meanwhile, Caterpillar is not waiting for government to solve its problems. As in the postwar years, the company is using its financial clout to loosen up the market. Reminiscent of its solution to the dollar shortage after World War II, Cat recently moved to offset foreign exchange shortages by establishing the Caterpillar World Trading Corporation. The new corporation will exchange its products for other goods and services that can be marketed immediately. In another effort to make the purchase of its products more enticing, Cat took advantage of the high resale value of its products and initiated the Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation to provide leasing arrangements for customers.

The company has also expanded its product line but not, as in former days, by expanding its manufacturing base. Instead, for the first time, Caterpillar has agreed to sell products made by other manufacturers. CMI in Oklahoma has contracted with Caterpillar to manufacture asphalt and concrete paving machines under the Caterpillar trademark. While the company is engaged in a vast number of projects to improve its profitability, these projects will probably not bring an influx of jobs to Illinois.

It is apparent that Caterpillar's return to health does not necessarily foreshadow a similar recovery for central Illinois. Central Illinois is on its own. Caterpillar no longer depends on central Illinois business and labor, and central Illinois business and labor can no longer depend on Caterpillar. In the long range this may be healthy — like being placed on a sugarless diet. The cakes and candy may have tasted good originally, but they have recently caused a bad case of tooth decay. In this new international economy, both Caterpillar and central Illinois need to be competitive in a world market.

Carolyn Boiarsky, Ph.D., is a freelance writer residing in Peoria. She is an assistant professor at Illinois State University in Normal and a partner in Effective Writing Associates, a consulting firm which provides training in better writing techniques to high tech industries.

June 1986/Illinois Issues/11

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