Why Is Private Unionism Shrinking
While Public Unionism Grows?

Unionism in the United States has changed dramatically in the last 20 years. In the private sector, it has withered: the proportion of nonagricultural wage and salary workers who are in unions has fallen from one-third of the labor force to only 14 percent — a level comparable to that of the Great Depression. On the other hand, the proportion of public sector workers who are unionized has grown from about 11 percent in the 1960s to over one-third today. Because the private sector employs five out of every six workers, the percentage of the labor force that is unionized has plummeted from 36 percent in 1956 to 18 percent in 1986. One in three union workers is now a government employee.

In Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States (NBER Working Paper No. 2399), Richard Freeman argues that private sector unionism has declined mainly because management opposition to union organization has increased. Public sector unionism has expanded, he believes, mainly because of the passage of comprehensive collective bargaining laws.

Freeman disposes of two standard explanations for the decline in unions. One is that increased employment in occupations (white collar), demographic groups (females and college graduates), industries (services), and regions (the South) that are traditionally nonunion explains the decline in unionism. Such "structural" explanations come up against a very inconvenient fact, Freeman notes: unionization has not declined nearly as much in other countries (notably Canada) that have had the same change in the structure of employment.

Nor can changes in public opinion account for the decline, because it simply has not changed much. Public approval of unions, as measured by surveys, was the same in 1985 as in 1973. Furthermore, in both 1977 and 1984, one-third of nonunion workers said that they wanted unions at their workplaces. Yet unionism declined sharply over this whole period.

Freeman finds that about half of the decline in unionization can be accounted for by increases in unfair labor practices. One indicator of anti-union activity by private management, notes Freeman, is the number of charges of "unfair" labor practices (the term used by the National Labor Relations Board) brought against management by unions. Such practices typically occur when a union is trying to organize. The annual number has roughly quadrupled since 1960. This increase cannot be attributed simply to a higher proclivity of unions for complaining to the NLRB: the proportion of such charges upheld in court has been roughly constant.

But why has management become more opposed to unions? Freeman argues that the stakes are higher now. In the 1970s the premium paid to union workers rose and unionism became more costly for employers. Also, increased competition from expanded international trade, deregulation, and nonunion firms is making unionism expensive.

In the public sector, on the other hand, there has been virtually no management opposition to unions. This void has made laws requiring collective bargaining easier to pass and has made union organizing easier. One reason for this lack of opposition is that a large percentage of public sector workers vote: they can punish recalcitrant politicians (or employers). Also, public sector employers who illegally oppose unions are likely to be removed from office. Finally, unions and their employers are often allies in lobbying for increased government spending. Government managers may welcome unions for their help in obtaining larger budgets.

In interpreting his findings, Freeman makes two caveats. First, unfair labor practices may substitute for lawful activity by management against unions: if so, Freeman's estimates understate the full impact of management's fight against unions. Second, lawful anti-union activity may complement unfair activity: in this case, Freeman's measures overstate the impact of unfair practices but may accurately measure the impact of management opposition, lawful and otherwise. •

Page 24 / Illinois Municipal Review / April 1988