Minor's name can be published

The Illinois Juvenile Court Act permits a judge to forbid publication of the identity of a minor charged under the act (see Illinois Revised Statues 1985, ch. 37, sec. 701-20(6)). In a decision filed March 22 the Illinois Supreme Court said that this provision cannot be constitutionnally applied when a newspaper has learned the name through "ordinary reportorial techniques."

In this case a reporter for The Daily Journal of Kankakee learned the identity of a minor charged with a fatal shooting from conversation with a police chief and a juvenile probation officer. She also observed that members of the Watsteka City Council mentioned the juvenile's name freely. She used the juvenile's name in her news story. At the second court hearing the judge ordered reporters not to use the name. When she disobeyed the order the judge banned reporters of the paper from the juvenile procedings unless they agreed to abide by his orders.

The high court held that, since the information was obviously in the public domain, application of section 1-20(6) would be an abridgement of constitutional rights of freedom of speech and press. It said, "Whatever interest the State may legitimately assert in keeping the name of a minor secret, that interest is hardly compelling when the State itself, or its agents, have helped to disclose the minor's identity." It stated categorically that "we do not reach the question of whether an exercise of the power granted in section 1-20(6) would be unconstitutional in all instances."

Justice William G. Clark wrote the opinion in In re a Minor (127 Ill. 2d 247). Justice Horace L. Calvo did not participate.

Courts clerks don't pay interest

For the first time the Illinois Supreme Court was asked whether circuit court clerks who hold litigants' funds pending settlement of an action must deposit such funds in interest-bearing bank accounts. The court said no in its March 29 decision.

Under court order the circuit court clerk of Cook County held funds covering an insurance company's admitted liability until settlement was reached; he was then ordered to distribute the money. A recipient demanded interest on her portion.

The high court noted that "no constitutional or statutory provision governs a clerk of court's duty to hold litigants' funds. Rather, that duty arises solely by order of the circuit court." In analogous cases where government officials hold individuals' funds the court has found no fiduciary duty of the official to place the money in an interest-bearing account unless provided by statute.

Justices Daniel P. Ward and Horace L. Calvo did not participate in Madlener v. Finley (Docket No. 66105). Justice William G. Clark also wrote this opinion.

Obscene bookstore not a nuisance

An Illinois Supreme Court decision of March 22 ruled unconstitutional portions of the Criminal Code that regulate public nuisances (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, sees. 37-1, 37-4). The law provides that property adjudged to be a public nuisance be shut down for one year; obscenity is one of the grounds for such a judgment. An owner or lessee can keep the property open by posting a bond and guaranteeing cessation of the offense.

Over a four-year period the Kendall County state's attorney had secured several obscenity convictions against the Denmark II Bookstore. In 1986 he sought an injunction closing the store, citing those convictions. When this was granted the operators posted bond to keep the store open and were subsequently prosecuted for failing to abstain from continued sale of obscene material. The bond was revoked and the store closed.

The high court agreed with the appellate court that application of the nuisance statute to adult bookstores for selling obscene material was unconstitutional abridgement of first amendment guarantees of free speech. Obscenity is not protected, but the court held that closing the store for a year might constitute prior restraint on sale of protected material.

Terming application of the nuisance statute a "blunderbuss approach," the court pointed out that "the owner of property from which a single obscene work is sold stands in the same danger of losing, for one year, the entire value of his investment, as does the owner of a property from which are sold obscene works in the hundreds or thousands." The court found the penalties for pornography adequate deterrents and said that "the State has at its disposal far less draconian, and far more narrowly focused, means of combatting pornography's environmental effects."

Justice William G. Clark wrote for the majority in People v. Sequoia Books Inc. (127 Ill. 2d 271). Chief Justice Thomas J. Moran did not participate.

Justice Ben Miller dissented, joined by Justice Howard C. Ryan. Miller felt that the statute does not impose prior restraint on protected speech since it effects only the property. Operators may carry out business at another location or secure use of the same property by posting bond.

Counties pay but don't employ

The chief judge of a circuit is sole employer of nonjudicial court personnel for purposes of collective bargaining, according to the Illinois Supreme Court. On March 29 the court filed the latest in a series of decisions establishing the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government.

In four counties different unions had sought status as bargaining agent for nonjudicial court employees. The Illinois State Labor Relations Board had identified the county and the chief judge as joint employers for purposes of collective bargaining under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, sec. 101 et seq.). The four chief judges involved petitioned the high court for reversal of this decision.

The Illinois courts constitute a unified statewide system, but counties must fund the courts. Counties fear that wage scales set solely by the chief judge might affect county revenues and taxation, while the courts feel that county intransigence on wages might impair their flexibility in bargaining on other issues. The Supreme Court has consistently recommended statewide funding of the court system, most recently in its annual report (January 27) to the General Assembly.

The court had earlier ruled that "counties have the power and duty to set and pay salaries of circuit courts' nonjudicial employees" (People ex rel. Bier v. Scholz (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 12, 17-18), but also that courts retain power to "require production of facilities, personnel and resources reasonably necessary" to their operations (Knuepfer v. Fawell (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 284, 293). It ruled that this aspect of the separation of powers makes the courts sole employers of nonjudicial personnel and said, "The mere need for county board approval in order to effectuate judicial-branch salaries negotiated at the bargaining table does not logically mandate inclusion of the counties in the bargaining" (emphasis added).

Judge John J. Stamos wrote the opinion in Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (Docket No. 66984). Justices Daniel P. Ward and Horace L. Calvo did not participate.

Other decisions

• On March 29 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, sec. 1701 et seq.) divests circuit courts of the power to enjoin arbitration in public educational labor disputes. It called the act "a comprehensive statutory scheme, creating rights and duties

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which have no counterpart in common law or equity." It said that the Illinois Educationa Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction in deciding whether an issue is arbitrable, with review available in the appellate court.

Justice William B. Clark wrote the opinion in Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren Township Federation of Teachers, Local 504 (Docket Nos. 66361, 66964, 66981, 67050 cons.). Justice Daniel P. Ward did not participate.

• Cook county was allowed to confiscate a 1946 Buick because the driver spilled cocaine on the floor when police stopped him for running a stop sign. In a March 29 opinion the Illinois Supreme Court said that "the inescapable conclusion is that the vehicle was used . . . to make Smith's continued possession of the drug easier." It found this to be a clear violation of language of the Controlled Substances Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56 1/2, sec. 1505 (a) (3)), which makes vehicles subject to forfeiture if used "in any manner to facilitate any violation of this Act." It reversed lower courts which held that the vehicle had to be found essential to transportation of the substance. It also stopped short of addressing the proposition that mere possession by the occupant would be a reason for forfeiture.

  Chief Justice Thomas J. Moran wrote the unanimous opinion in People v. 1946 Buick, VIN 34423520 (Docket No. 66468). Justice Daniel P. Ward did not participate.

• In another March 29 decision the Illinois Supreme Court clarified a matter on which lower courts have disagreed. The Contribution Act provides: ". . . where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them" (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, sec. 302). In other words, where several parties (tortfeasors) have contributed to injuries (torts), all can be required to contribute to awards to the injured party. Courts in Illinois have disagreed as to whether this applies to unintentional tortfeasors.

  In the present case two partners in a real estate development acted to sell the interest of one to a third party. The selling partner prepared an incomplete list of liabilities and was subsequently found guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. He asked the court to make the other partner liable for part of the damage payments. The high court here ruled that the intentional tortfeasor was not entitled to contribution from the unintentional tortfeasor.

  Justice William G. Clark's opinion in Gerill Corp. v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders Inc. (Docket Nos. 66788, 67035 cons.) had to trace legislative history and case law through earlier Illinois decisions back to an English case. Justices Daniel P. Ward and Horace L. Calvo did not participate.         F. Mark Siebert

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