Court Briefs                                                    

Illinois' limits on auto searches
The police have to get permission to search closed containers in cars. In a recent case decided by the Illinois Supreme Court, officers had stopped a vehicle that had no license plate. After the passengers were asked to get out, the police got the driver's permission to search the vehicle. In a purse on the passenger seat they found cocaine. At the trial, the passenger who owned the purse claimed that she had not given permission to search it. The high court agreed.

The U.S. Supreme Court has created an "automobile exception" to the constitutional prohibition on warrantless searches. Officers searching a lawfully stopped vehicle may search closed containers if they have probable cause to suspect them of containing evidence of a crime. That was not the case here.

The Illinois court declined to accept the federally established "apparent authority" rule under which police may make searches if they have received permission from someone who apparently has authority to grant it. In this case there was no reason to believe that the driver had authority to give permission to search the purse. The court, therefore, did not address the applicability of the rule in Illinois.

Justice Mary Ann McMorrow wrote for the majority in People v James (Docket No. 75490). Justice James D. Heiple dissented.

Police must notify suspect of lawyer's presence
"The day is long past in Illinois... where attorneys must shout legal advice to their clients ... through the jailhouse door." With these words the Illinois Supreme Court departed from the U.S. Supreme Court on a crucial matter: whether the police must inform persons being questioned that an attorney is present.

In this case, a man being questioned about a shooting was not told that a lawyer sent by his family was at the police station. At the trial, evidence gained by police questioning was suppressed on the ground that his waiver of right to counsel was not valid.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in these circumstances a waiver of an attorney's assistance is valid. In its decision the court said that state courts might interpret their own constitutional provisions more broadly. In a series of cases, Illinois accepted this invitation and developed different requirements that the Illinois high court said are supported by statutes and the state Constitution.

The case is surely of theoretical interest to legal scholars, but it has immense practical significance for anyone questioned by the police. Justice Charles E. Freeman's 27-page opinion in People v McCauley (Docket No. 73800) is formidable. There is much for scholars to ponder. Chief Justice Michael A. Bilandic, joined by Justices Benjamin K. Miller and James D. Heiple, concurred in part and dissented in part; Miller, joined by Heiple, also concurred in part and dissented in part; Heiple on his own concurred in part and dissented in part.

Phone taps sometimes OK
"Warning, your telephone conversation may be recorded without your knowledge or consent. Use at your own peril." Chief Justice Michael A. Bilandic argued that a majority opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court might require this message on telephones.

In this case, an alleged victim of sexual abuse phoned the defendant. The call was made from the police station and recorded by police with the victim's consent. The defendant claimed that use of this recording at the trial violated the Illinois eavesdropping statute, which requires the consent to the taping of all parties to a conversation. The high court found precedent in a 1986 Illinois decision that was in turn based on a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. These decisions hold that such taping, if consented to by one party, is merely a way of making a reliable record of a conversation that the consenting party would know about and be able to use anyway.

Justice Moses W. Harrison II wrote for the majority in People v Herrington (Docket No. 76453). Bilandic's dissent, joined by Justice Mary Ann McMorrow, said that the taping violated the eavesdropping statute since it did not have the consent of all parties, and that the precedent cited by the majority differed too much in detail to be applicable.