Cure sectionalism by returning to
cumulative voting system
By Charles N. Wheeler III
Copyright Illinois Issues. Reprinted with permission from Illinois Issues, June 1995 magazine,
published by Sangamon State University, Springfield, Illinois 62794-9243.
A house divided against itself cannot stand.
Abraham Lincoln, 1858
|
Although spoken in a bygone age and in a different
context, that admonition of Illinois' most famous citizen
is well worth recalling in the state's current political
environment.
In his remarks to the Republican state convention
that endorsed him for the U.S. Senate, Lincoln was
referring to his conviction that the nation could not
survive with slavery outlawed in some states but permitted in others. But the timeless, underlying message
the need for unity among people who share a common polity is particularly relevant in the wake of a
spring session scarred by partisan animosity and regional hostility.
Sectional rivalries are nothing new in Illinois, of
course. For years, Chicago-bashing has been a staple of
legislative candidates in the suburbs and downstate,
while Chicago politicians routinely gripe about shabby
treatment from the state. And each region fervently
believes the others disproportionately benefit from the
taxes its residents pay.
|
Sectional rivalries are not new in Illinois,
of course. And each region believes the others
benefit from the taxes its residents pay.
|
The hostility neared record levels this spring, however, in a legislature in which suburban Republicans are
firmly in charge and city Democrats are on the run. The
proximate cause of the flare-up was a GOP plan for a
regional airport authority dominated by suburban interests to oversee Chicago's airports. More fundamentally, though, legislative demographics fosters partisan
antagonism between the city and its suburbs. Suburbanites dominate GOP ranks in the Senate and the
House, while most Democratic lawmakers are Chicagoans. Downstaters are a minority in each of the four
partisan caucuses.
Thus, when suburban Republicans decide to punish
the city for perceived slights, there is no Chicago contingent to urge moderation; only one Republican lawmaker represents a district with a majority of its population in Chicago. Similarly, there are only three collar
county Democrats none from DuPage, Kane or
McHenry to champion the concerns of those areas in
Democratic caucuses.
Certainly, encouraging a broader, even statewide,
perspective among legislative partisans is desirable.
How might that be achieved? Well, perhaps it's time
to reconsider cumulative voting, a home-grown system
of minority representation born some 125 years ago
when Illinois was even more deeply split along partisan
and sectional lines. Its author was Joseph Medill,
owner-editor of the Chicago Tribune and a delegate to
the convention that drafted the 1870 constitution.
At the time, historical settlement patterns and Civil
War passions had divided Illinois geographically and
politically into a northern half controlled by Republicans and a southern half dominated by Democrats. To
help heal the split, Medill proposed a House in which
three members would be elected from each district.
Voters could cast a single vote for each of three candidates, give a vote and a half to two candidates, or
cumulate all three votes for a single candidate.
The plan, Medill told the convention, "will put in the
Legislature Democrats from northern Illinois, Republicans, in equal numbers, from southern Illinois, and secure to both parties representation from all parts of the
State."
July 1995 / Illinois Municipal Review / Page 13
Medill's invention held sway from 1870 until 1980,
when voters ratified the Legislative Cutback Amendment, which reduced the size of the House by one-third
and installed single-member districts.
At the time, proponents argued the change would
save taxpayers some $7 million a year in legislative
expenses, cut down on the number of bills introduced in
the House, and increase competition and enhance accountability by forcing incumbents to run in one-on-one contests.
Fifteen years later, though, it's clear that the switch
to single-member districts has produced none of these
presumed benefits. True, salaries, district allowances,
daily expenses and mileage were saved for 59 lawmakers. But House operating costs $20.3 million for the
last General Assembly elected under cumulative voting
grew to $33.9 million in the 1993-94 biennium, paralleling total state budget growth. The average number
of House bills introduced in the last four General Assemblies has been about 23 percent higher than for the
final four bienniums with a larger House. Moreover,
only a relative handful of House districts are competitive today, while incumbents still enjoy a high level of
job security in between redistricting years.
But the switch to single-member House districts has
seen troubling developments: a concentration of legislative power in party leaders, less independence among
the membership, fewer votes cast on principle rather
than on politics, and increasing regional polarization of
the two parties.
Cumulative voting would ameliorate such ills. Individual lawmakers would find it easier to stray from the
party line and to take positions with significant, though
less than majority, support, knowing like-minded voters could cast three votes their way. Alternate viewpoints would be more likely to surface, and voices from
all regions of the state would be heard and have to be
heeded in each party's caucus.
Restoration of cumulative voting would not require
a return to a 177-member House; in fact, there were
only 153 House members elected from 51 House districts from Medill's time until the number was increased
to 177 from 59 districts by a 1954 redistricting amendment. Three members elected from each of 39 districts,
for example, would produce 117 House members, one
less than the current body. A plan using 45 districts,
each electing one senator and three representatives,
would result in only three more lawmakers.
Whatever the number of districts, what's most important is the certainty that cumulative voting will restore legislative representation for adherents of both
parties, wherever they reside, and thus temper the regional antipathy so pervasive in the current assembly.
As Joseph Medill asked his fellow delegates 125
years ago, "Is not this right, just, politic and advisible?"
Charles N. Wheeler III is director of the Public Affairs Reporting
program at University of Illinois at Springfield (formerly Sangamon
State University).
Page 14 / Illinois Municipal Review / July 1995
|