RIVER BEND REVISITED - THE ILLINOIS
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT
PROHIBIT NO-SPOUSE POLICIES
By KELLY A. CAHILL. Zukowski. Rosrers. Hood & McArdle. Crystal Lake
The Illinois Supreme Court recently resolved a
conflict between the Appellate Courts as to whether
no-spouse policies violate the Illinois Human Rights
Act's prohibition against discrimination based on marital status. The Court held that an employer's no-spouse policy is not marital discrimination under the
Act. Boaden v. State Department of Law Enforcement,
171 Ill.2d 230, 215 Ill.Dec. 664, 664 N.E.2d 61 (Il.Sp.Ct.
1996).
In 1992, the Third District Appellate Court in River
Bend Community Unit School District No. 2 v. Illinois
Human Rights Commission, 232 Ill.App.3d 838, 173
Ill.Dec. 868, 597 N.E.2d 842 (3rd Dist. 1992) held that a
school district's policy prohibiting one spouse from directly supervising the other was marital status discrimination prohibited under the Illinois Human Rights Act
(775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.). Id. at 846. Two years later, the
Fourth District Appellate Court in Boaden v. State
Department of Law Enforcement, 267 Ill.App. 645,
205 Ill.Dec. 213, 642 N.E.2d 1330 (4th Dist. 1994) held
that the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement's unwritten policy prohibiting spouses from working on the
same shift and in the same patrol area was not marital
status discrimination prohibited under the Act. The
husband and wife plaintiffs, relying on the River Bend
decision, appealed the Fourth District Appellate Court's
decision to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Illinois
Supreme Court, recognizing the conflict between the
districts, granted the plaintiffs leave to appeal.
In its decision, the Court noted that under the Act,
"It is a civil rights violation:
For any employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or
to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion,
renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms,
privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of
unlawful discrimination or citizenship status." 775 ILCS
5/2-102(A) (West 1992).
The Act defines unlawful discrimination as follows:
"'Unlawful discrimination' means discrimination
against a person because of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status,
handicap or unfavorable discharge from military service as those terms are defined in this Section." 775
ILCS 5/1-103(Q) (West 1992). (Emphasis added.)
The Act then defines marital status:
"'Marital status' means the legal status of being
married, single, separated, divorced or widowed." 775
ILCS 5/1-103(J) (West 1992).
The Court agreed with the Fourth District
Appellate Court's interpretation of the Act that marital
status discrimination does not include no-spouse policies, i.e., discrimination based on the identity of one's
spouse. The Court held that as defined under the Act,
"marital status discrimination is discrimination
based on an individual's legal status as married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed. In our view, a
policy prohibiting spouses from working together
presents an entirely different kind of harm than discrimination based on an individual's legal status. In
order to find discrimination under these facts, we
must consider not only the individual's legal status,
but also the individual's relationship to a particular
employee. Had the legislature intended to reach
this kind of conduct, it would have done so in specific and certain terms." Boaden, 664 N.E.2d at 65.
Even though the Court held that no-spouse policies
are not prohibited under the Act, the Court declined to
express an opinion as to whether such anti-nepotism
policies are wise or based on sound reasoning. Id.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court has resolved the
conflict between the Appellate Courts and has made it
clear that no-spouse policies are not marital discrimination prohibited by the Illinois Human Rights Act.
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August 1996 / Illinois Municipal Review / Page 9
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